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A description of any social institution such as the state will 
be shaped (and limited) by the conceptual apparatus chosen by 
the investigator. This is an obvious point; different priorities and 
methodologies will highlight different features and generate 
different explanations. Where some features are illuminated, 
others are correspondingly left in shadow. When it comes to 
describing the state, we would expect a political scientist to ask 
different questions and work with different concepts than, say, a 
sociologist. And a lawyer? Academic lawyers who examine the 
state have often focused on what Nick Barber calls legalistic 
accounts: they examine rules, and the commands that the rules 
instantiate, and the nature of the authority by which the 
commands are made. These legalistic accounts of the state 
include the enduring contributions of Hans Kelsen and Max 
Weber, as well as the strain of Oxford analytical legal philosophy 
exemplified by the work of H. L. A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and 
Leslie Green. These studies attend closely to the vertical 
relationship between the state and its members (typically, its 
citizens) constituted by legal rules. In setting out his own account 
of the state—an account that is self-consciously more 
interdisciplinary in method—Barber acknowledges these 
intellectual debts and identifies several points of disagreement 
(and agreement) with them, but his focus is predominately on 
those features of the state that have been left neglected or 
under-explained in these more legalistic accounts. 
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Barber’s proposal is to consider the state as a social group 
and, specifically, a group that uses rules (legal and nonlegal) to 
relate members not only—or even predominantly—to the 
governing institutions, but to each other. This approach to the 
state necessitates first coming to terms with the nature of social 
groups generally and how the state qualifies as a social group 
(chapter 2), the forms of membership in that social group 
(chapter 3), and the rules that bind the members to the state and 
to each other (chapters 4–6). With the main concepts thus 
articulated, Barber carries on in chapters 7–10 to test drive his 
model. Is it intelligible, he asks, to attribute intentions and 
actions to the state (chapter 7)? If it is, to what extent (and in 
what sense) can states be responsible for their actions? To what 
extent do current members of the state share that responsibility, 
and what should be required of them as a consequence? Does it 
lessen responsibility if the actions in question took place several 
lifetimes ago (chapter 8)? In the book’s final grouping of 
chapters (9–10), Barber addresses the claims of legal and 
constitutional pluralism, particularly in the context of the 
European Union. 
All of this is preceded by an opening chapter that addresses 
methodology in constitutional theory—a free-standing essay that 
ought to be required reading for any serious student of 
constitutional theory. Barber surveys rival approaches to 
constitutional theory, including historical, critical, interpretive, 
and political. Although he argues for the priority of interpretive 
theory (in the sense that other approaches presuppose an 
interpretive account) (pp. 2–5), he nevertheless insists that other 
approaches to constitutional theory are “all . . . valuable, all . . . 
compatible, and all play a part in our understanding of the 
nature and functioning of constitutions” (pp. 1–2). In keeping 
with Weber, Hart, and John Finnis, Barber works from the 
postulate that it is the task of the constitutional theorist to 
identify the “central case” of the constitutional institution under 
investigation (p. 8). Identifying the central case cannot be a 
merely descriptive enterprise, because it requires the theorist to 
evaluate the criteria by which centrality will be assessed. It is 
inescapable that theorists begin with some “ethical framework 
which gives content to the good and the bad, and then use this to 
identify features of importance” (p. 10). From this, Barber 
proposes that “a good account of a constitutional institution will 
identify those features which enable it to advance, or to threaten, 
the well-being of people” (p. 11). 
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The state, then, must be evaluated (as must its 
constitutional institutions) and Barber follows Aristotle in 
selecting the well-being of the state’s members as the central 
criterion for evaluation (p. 12). Unavoidably, a theorist’s account 
will be shaped by what Barber labels one’s “ethical beliefs,” 
generated from one’s understanding of “human flourishing” (p. 
11). For Barber, this is “an unhappy consequence” because, he 
explains, the attractiveness of the theorist’s account of the state 
will depend on “the attractions of the rival political ideologies 
that lie behind them” (p. 11). But what, a reader might well ask, 
is the reason for this regret? Is it a function of a relativistic meta-
ethics? Does it flow from a belief that well-being is the product 
of whatever ideologies to which one happens to be attached? 
But despite a few lines in which Barber suggests that one’s con-
clusions about what constitutes well-being will be the products of 
pre-existing social commitments,3 such a reading should be 
resisted on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with 
Barber’s overall methodology. And like Hart (and notwith-
standing Hart’s characterization of his own work as an in part an 
exercise in descriptive sociology),4 Barber never backs away 
from judging some practices as choice-worthy and denouncing 
others as “entirely bad” (p. 13). Instead, Barber’s misgiving is 
better read as stemming from the concern that disagreement 
about what constitutes human well-being (whatever the truth of 
the matter is) will be an unavoidable barrier to agreement about 
what constitutes a good account of the state. 
The decision not to pursue a more comprehensive account 
of human well-being (or even take sides in any debate about the 
nature of well-being) is regrettable but defensible; the 
methodological injunction to use well-being as a criterion for 
understanding the state can be compatible with many 
conceptions of well-being, and the theorist who is articulating a 
methodology can be content to observe that his methodology is 
compatible with all (or many) of them.5 But even though it is 
defensible for Barber to remain largely aloof from questions 
about the nature of well-being, one can wish that he had said 
something more about the state’s jurisdiction to advance well-
 
 3. E.g., “a theorist’s account will be conditioned by her ethical beliefs,” such as the 
ethical beliefs of individualists, communitarians, nationalists, and libertarians, and these 
“different political ideologies will generate different accounts of social phenomena” (p. 
11).  
 4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii (Oxford 1961). 
 5. Once again, there are echoes of Hart’s methodology in articulating of a general 
theory of law that was to be independent of conceptions of human flourishing.  
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being. Here again, there is a constellation of possibilities: can the 
state prohibit conduct that harms the well-being of the actor, or 
just the well-being of third parties? Is the state authorized to 
promote every aspect of a person’s or group’s well-being, or just 
some subset related to interpersonal life? Or does well-being 
instead require that persons be allowed maximum autonomy to 
define and follow their own conception of well-being? Once 
again, these questions are off-menu. But one should be reluctant 
to quibble about what is left out when so much else is on offer. 
Throughout, The Constitutional State identifies more areas of 
fruitful inquiry (drawing on the resources of many disciplines 
including political philosophy, action theory, psychology, and 
neuropsychology) than it can fully pursue. The book’s breadth 
and interdisciplinarity leads to many unexpected discoveries, but 
the result is sometimes (as in this instance) like settling in to a 
conversation with a learned friend, wrestling together with 
questions that provide both new insight and further questions 
and then—too soon—it’s time to go. 
At the heart of The Constitutional State is a trio of chapters 
devoted to understanding legal and nonlegal rules: how they 
constitute social groups, how they provide reasons for action, 
how they contribute to a legal order. Although these chapters 
are part of a progression of thought intended to illuminate our 
understanding of the state, they serve equally as free-standing 
essays in jurisprudence and constitutional theory. Chapter 4, on 
“The Constitution of Social Groups,” clearly locates Barber 
within the Oxford tradition of analytical legal philosophy. But 
although Barber is fully conversant in the paradigms of rules 
explored by Hart, Raz, Finnis, and others, he is not writing a 
mere history of ideas; he clears away debris where conflict is 
more apparent than real, and picks up the fruitful strands of 
thought that were left neglected by others. The premise of 
chapter 4 is that “[a]ll social groups are constituted by rules” (p. 
67). At a minimum, even for the simplest of social groups, there 
must be shared rules setting “the objective the group is aiming to 
achieve,” the membership of the group, who is to be bound by 
the rules of the group, and how the group will make decisions (p. 
67). These rules can be as simple and open-ended as a resolution 
of a group of friends “to meet up with the intention of 
undertaking an activity together, without any clear idea of what 
that activity will consist” (p. 67). For such a group, the 
constitutive rule identifies (1) the reason that the group has for 
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being a group (e.g., to pursue a good such as friendship), as well 
as (2) a means chosen to participate in that good (p. 67). 
Although simple social groups can be constituted by rules 
that remain largely unconscious, large and complicated groups, 
like states, need formal institutions for making decisions and 
resolving disputes (pp. 72–73). Barber usefully distinguishes 
between those internal rules that a group sets for itself and those 
external rules that are set by others outside of the group. In an 
interesting discussion, Barber points to the possibility of conflict 
between internal and external rules, and observes that when 
conflict occurs, it is not obvious as to which will prevail, which 
will become the “real” rule. In an example drawn from the law 
of charities, Barber demonstrates that a charity that finds that its 
chosen purpose violates an external rule (such as some rule of 
charity law) has several options: it can change its purpose to 
bring it to conformity with the law, or it can pretend to conform 
to the external rule while secretly leaving its conduct unchanged, 
or it can openly defy the external rule (pp. 70–72). The 
opportunity for conflict between internal and external rules is 
magnified in the case of the state, and Barber specifically applies 
his account of rules to the complex case of the state in chapter 5 
(and further develops it in his discussion of constitutional 
pluralism and the case of the European Union in chapters 9 and 
10). 
Constitutions, Barber tells us, can contain both legal and 
non-legal rules, and can include laws drawn from other legal 
systems. So despite Kelsen’s historical (and contemporary) 
influence over much British constitutional scholarship (p. 77), 
Barber argues that Kelsen’s account of the state is “incompatible 
with a central strength of [British constitutional] scholarship: the 
recognition of the plurality of sources of the constitutions” (p. 
78). Within this plurality of sources, Barber would include, for 
example, international law, regardless of whether it has been 
incorporated within the domestic system by a rule of domestic 
law. His reasoning is that, to the extent that such an 
unincorporated rule is followed by state officers and institutions 
and treated by them as binding, it forms part of the constitution 
(p. 80). Broadly ecumenical, Barber would include constitutional 
principles in the constitution, rejecting a sharp divide between 
constitutional rules and principles. Principles, such as those 
based in references to “dignity” or “equality” in constitutional 
preambles, may be understood as generalized rules that may or 
may not be legally enforceable, but nevertheless may have 
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directive force for state officers and institutions (pp. 86–87).6 
Similarly, Barber rejects a sharp distinction between con-
stitutional laws and conventions, arguing that conventions and 
laws are two types of social rule that share many common 
qualities and functions, and that the differences between them 
are matters of degree. Conventions can be converted into laws 
by both legislatures and courts (p. 103). 
Having explored the nature of the rules that bind citizens to 
the state and to each other, Barber turns in chapters 7 and 8 to a 
novel exploration of the moral character and responsibility of 
the state. The argument ranges freely through psychology and 
philosophy (culminating in the half-apologetic “[w]e have 
strayed a long way from constitutional theory” (p. 118)) in the 
service of an intensely practical set of questions: Is it meaningful 
to conclude that a state is responsible for it actions? What is the 
rationale for holding it responsible? What are the state 
obligations that flow from this responsibility? And can citizens—
as members of the state—be rightly held responsible for state 
actions that they not only did not participate in, but disavowed? 
What obligations for redress fall on citizens? It is important to 
understand in what sense the state possesses intentions and 
undertakes actions in order to understand: (1) what it has done, 
(2) what it is responsible for, and (3) what character it possesses. 
The implication for the citizen is again mediated through the 
concept of well-being: Being a member of a morally deficient 
state makes one’s life less of a success than it otherwise would be 
(p. 104). 
“States form intentions and undertake actions. They have 
successes and failures, embarking on commendable projects and 
vicious schemes” (p. 124). It is important to get clear on the 
concept of responsibility for state action (both at the level of the 
state and the level of the citizen), because it bears on what 
remedial action may be required of both the state and the 
citizen. Barber catalogues the various categories of responsibility 
(including causal, moral, legal, role, and remedial (pp. 124–30)) 
and discusses different respects in which a state or person can be 
judged to be responsible for an action or occurrence. Deter-
minations of responsibility are particularly tricky when there is a 
 
 6. There is also an extensive literature on the question of what functions 
constitutional principles ought to have in constitutional litigation. See, for example, 
chapters by T. R. S. Allan, Mark Walters, and Jeffrey Goldsworthy in EXPOUNDING THE 
CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant Huscroft ed., Cambridge, 
2008). 
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break in the constitutional continuity of a state. To what extent 
(and in what sense) is the contemporary South African state 
responsible for the misdeeds of Apartheid South Africa? A 
critical concept highlighted by Barber is remedial responsibility. 
While the new state may in no way be morally responsible for 
the actions carried out by its predecessor, it may nevertheless 
bear a remedial responsibility for cleaning up the mess left 
behind. The question is important because, as Barber notes, 
“[d]iscussion of responsibility often rapidly shades into 
discussion of how we should react to a finding of responsibility; 
when blame or punishment is an appropriate reaction to a 
person’s conduct” (p. 127). 
This distinction between moral responsibility and remedial 
responsibility leads Barber to conclude that to the extent that 
contemporary Britons, for example, benefit from wrongs that 
may have been done by their colonizing ancestors, they may 
(while not attracting any blame for any wrongs committed by the 
state in carrying out imperialist policies) nevertheless have a 
remedial responsibility to others for the benefits that they have 
retained and currently enjoy (p. 128). 
The discussion of the citizen’s responsibility leads to some 
surprising conclusions. Members of the state, Barber argues, are 
not simply responsible for those actions which they are 
personally implicated in. They are also responsible—in some 
sense—“for actions they oppose or are neutral towards” (p. 134). 
This is because a citizen has the capacity to participate in the 
state’s decision-making, and therefore bears some responsibility 
for failing to stop measures that the citizen judges to be 
wrongful. This surprising conclusion is generated from the judg-
ment that “[i]t is better to have been a citizen who opposed a 
bad policy, and failed, than to have been a citizen who defended 
this measure—but it is far better still to have succeeded in 
stopping your state embarking on a misguided action” (p. 134). 
Barber is willing to follow the logic of the argument to its 
unappealing terminus: That state members who are themselves 
victims of state wrongs (e.g., are members of a persecuted 
minority) are partly responsible for their own mistreatment. 
Barber fully acknowledges that to attribute responsibility in such 
a scenario “might appear unduly onerous” (p. 134). 
Nevertheless, he insists, such a concern would “rest on a 
misunderstanding of the implications of responsibility for those 
individuals” (p. 134). Membership would be, he says, “a form of 
tragedy” (p. 134). Doubtless it would be tragic, but on any 
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conception of responsibility surveyed by Barber, the ascription 
of responsibility in these circumstances seems bizarre. 
In chapters 9 and 10, Barber shifts his focus to the legal 
order and challenges what has become a growth industry in legal 
scholarship—legal pluralism. Barber focuses on two strands of 
legal pluralism: (1) the co-existence of legal and non-legal rules, 
and (2) contradiction between rules (pp. 146–48). A pluralist 
model for a legal order requires both multiple sources of law and 
the possibility of inconsistency between legal rules. Notwith-
standing much scholarship to the contrary, Barber argues that it 
is in fact difficult to find examples of the legal contradictions that 
are needed to make legal pluralism an interesting phenomenon 
(pp. 147–48). The Rhodesian crisis is explored as one example, 
and the European Union as the other. Barber concludes that 
having multiple sources of legal rules (such as EU and domestic 
legal systems) that create the possibility of inconsistency is not 
something to be necessarily feared. Constitutional dilemmas can 
remain unresolved “provided that each side exercises restraint” 
(p. 170). Inconsistent claims to authority can co-exist, and not 
undermine a stable framework for governing, provided that each 
side refrains from pressing their competing supremacy claims in 
the absence of actual conflict. The risks of actual conflict—of 
ultimately destabilizing the legal order—“provide incentives on 
each party to strive towards harmonious interpretations of the 
law” (p. 171). 
Constitutional pluralism is addressed as a distinct form of 
legal pluralism in chapter 10, one which is concerned with the 
overlap of states rather than legal systems. Barber works up to 
the ultimate question in the application of his conception of the 
state: Is the EU a state? It clearly possesses a territory, a 
membership, and a set of institutions. But the question is to be 
answered in terms of the relationship between these institutions 
and its members (p. 175). Indeed, the EU claims authority over 
its members, and expresses that authority directly through law. It 
claims primacy over contrary provisions of national law, its court 
claims supremacy over the interpretation of its law as well as the 
authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and it characterizes 
its members as citizens (p. 176). Although the authority claims of 
the EU may suggest that it understands itself to be a state, it is 
unclear that the people of Europe—the people whom the EU 
claims as citizens—accept the EU as a state. Barber endorses the 
argument that EU will only have become a state “when the 
people of Europe obey the commands of the Union because the 
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Union wills it, and not because of their allegiance to their 
national constitutional order” (p. 181). But Barber leaves open 
the possibility that the relationship between the EU and the 
people of Europe could change and make the authority claims of 
the EU more plausible. Were that to occur, it would generate 
genuine constitutional pluralism, where the authority claims of 
the EU and the member states would be in conflict. 
The Constitutional State is unfailingly intelligent and 
provocative, and should be welcomed by students of con-
stitutional theory, constitutional law, political science, and legal 
philosophy. 
 
